Monotone Instrumental Variables: With an Application to the Returns to Schooling by Charles F. Manski & John V. Pepper
       
MONOTONE INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES:
with an Application to the Returns to Schooling
Charles F. Manski









This research was supported in part by NSF Grant SBR-9722846.  We have benefitted
from the opportunity to present this work at the 1998 Winter Meeting of the
Econometric Society and in seminars at Duke University, the Federal Reserve
Board, Northwestern University, UCLA, the University of Bristol, the University
of Mississippi, the University of Southampton, the University of Texas at Austin,
and the University of Virginia.  We have also benefitted from the comments of
Jinyong Hahn, Mark Manuszak, and two anonymous reviewers.MONOTONE INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES: WITH AN APPLICATION TO THE RETURNS TO SCHOOLING
Charles F. Manski and John V. Pepper
Abstract
Econometric analyses of treatment response commonly use instrumental variable
(IV) assumptions to identify treatment effects.  Yet the credibility of IV
assumptions is often a matter of considerable disagreement.  There is therefore
good reason to consider weaker but more credible assumptions.  To this end, we
introduce monotone instrumental variable (MIV) assumptions and the important
special case of monotone treatment selection (MTS).  We study the identifying
power of MIV assumptions alone and combined with the assumption of monotone
treatment response (MTR).  We present an empirical application using the MTS and
MTR assumptions to place upper bounds on the returns to schooling.1 Whereas a variable v was originally called an instrumental variable if v has
zero covariance with a residual ,, the modern usage of the term has broadened to
embrace assumptions that specified functions of v and , are orthogonal.  Hence
it is now necessary to specify the type of IV assumption one has in mind. Mean
independence, quantile independence, and statistical independence assumptions (or
the orthogonality conditions that these assumptions yield) have all been
prominent in the literature.  See Manski (1988) pp. 25-26 and Section 6.1 for
discussion of the history and exposition of the variety of modern IV assumptions.
2 Several contributors to this literature have examined the identifying power of
IV assumptions in the absence of parametric restrictions on the form of response
functions.  Manski (1990, 1994) showed that  mean independence assumptions imply
sharp bounds on mean outcomes and average treatment effects.  Robins (1989) and
Balke and Pearl (1997) have considered the statistical independence assumption
that holds in classical randomized experiments, where response functions are
statistically independent of assigned treatments.  Hotz, Mullins, and Sanders
(1997) have studied contaminated instrument assumptions.  These suppose that a
mean-independence assumption holds in a population of interest, but the observed
population is a probability mixture of the population of interest and one in
which the assumption does not hold. 
1. Introduction
For fifty years econometric analyses of treatment response have made
extensive use of  instrumental variable (IV) assumptions holding that mean
response is constant across specified sub-populations of a population of
interest.1  Yet the credibility of mean independence conditions and other IV
assumptions has often been a matter of considerable disagreement, with much
debate about whether some covariate is or is not a "valid instrument" in an
application of interest.  There is therefore good reason to consider weaker but
more credible assumptions.  To this end, we introduce monotone instrumental
variable (MIV) assumptions holding that mean response varies weakly monotonically
across specified sub-populations.  We study the identifying power of these MIV
assumptions and give an empirical application.  The findings reported here add
to the literature developing nonparametric bounds on treatment effects.2
This paper uses the same formal setup as Manski (1997).  There is a
probability space (J, S, P) of individuals.  Each member j of population J has2
observable covariates xj 0 X and a response function yj(·): T 6 Y mapping the
mutually exclusive and exhaustive treatments t 0 T into outcomes y j(t) 0 Y.
Person j has a realized treatment zj 0 T and a realized outcome yj / yj(zj), both
of which are observable.  The latent outcomes yj(t), t / = zj are not observable.
An empirical researcher learns the distribution P(x, z, y) of covariates,
realized treatments, and realized outcomes by observing a random sample of the
population.  The researcher’s problem is to combine this empirical evidence with
assumptions in order to learn about the distribution P[y(·)] of response
functions, or perhaps the conditional distributions P[y(·)*x].
With this background, we may formally define the MIV assumptions to be
studied here.  Let x = (w, v) and X = W × V.  Each value of (w, v) defines an
observable sub-population of persons.  The familiar mean-independence form of IV
assumption is that, for each t 0 T and each value of w, the mean value of y(t)
is the same in all of the sub-populations (w, v = u),  u 0 V.  Thus,
IV Assumption: Covariate v is an instrumental variable in the sense of mean-
independence if, for each t 0 T, each value of w, and all (u, u’) 0 (V × V),
(1)  E[y(t)*w, v = u’]  =  E[y(t)*w, v = u].
MIV assumptions replace the equality in (1) by an inequality, yielding a mean-
monotonicity condition.  Thus
MIV Assumption: Let V be an ordered set.  Covariate v is a monotone instrumental
variable in the sense of mean-monotonicity if, for each t 0 T, each value of w,
and all (u1, u2) 0 (V × V) such that u2 $ u1,3
(2)  E[y(t)*w, v = u2]  $  E[y(t)*w, v = u1].
To illustrate how IV and MIV assumptions differ, let v measure a person’s
ability and consider how wage functions vary with realized schooling.  To use v
as an IV is to assume that persons with different measured ability have the same
mean wage functions.  To use v as an MIV is to assume that persons with higher
measured ability have weakly higher mean wage functions than do those with lower
measured ability.  If the type of ability measured by v is valued in the labor
market, it is reasonable to assume that v is an MIV but not that it is an IV.
Section 2 studies the identifying power of MIV assumptions alone, not
combined with other assumptions.  We report sharp bounds on the conditional mean
responses E[y(t)*w, v = u], u 0 V and the marginal mean E[y(t)*w].  These bounds
are informative if the outcome space Y is bounded and if the no-assumptions
bounds of Manski (1989) are not monotone increasing in u.  The MIV bounds take
a particularly simple form in the case of monotone treatment selection (MTS),
where the realized treatment z is itself an MIV.
Section 3 combines an MIV assumption with the monotone treatment response
(MTR) assumption of Manski (1997).  This is
MTR Assumption: Let T be an ordered set.  For each j 0 J,
(3)  t2  $  t1   Y   yj(t2)  $  yj(t1).
The MIV and MTR assumptions make distinct contributions to identification.  When
imposed together, the two assumptions can have substantial identifying power.
Combining the MTR and MTS assumptions yields a particularly interesting finding.4
Whereas the MIV-MTR bounds are generally informative only when Y is a bounded
outcome space, the MTS-MTR bounds are informative even if Y is unbounded.
Section 4 presents an empirical application using the MTS and MTR
assumptions to draw conclusions about the returns to schooling.  We analyze wage
and schooling data in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY).  In this
application, the MTS assumption asserts that persons who realize higher years of
schooling have weakly higher mean wage functions than do those who realize lower
levels of schooling.  The MTR assumption asserts that, ceteris paribus, wage
rises as a function of conjectured years of schooling. We find that combining
these assumptions yields informative upper bounds on the returns to schooling.
In particular, we find that the average year-by-year return to college completion
relative to high school completion is smaller than some of the point estimates
reported recently by labor economists.
To simplify the exposition in Sections 2 and 3, we henceforth leave
implicit the conditioning on w maintained in the definitions of MIVs.  To keep
the focus on identification, we treat identified quantities as known.  In the
empirical analysis of Section 4, we explicitly condition on specified covariates
w and we discuss statistical considerations.  Section 5 briefly calls attention
to some variations on the MIV theme.
2. Identification Using an MIV Assumption Alone
We examine here the identifying power of an MIV assumption alone.  We focus
on the problem of inference on the conditional means E[y(t)*v = u], u 0 V and the
marginal mean E[y(t)].  The findings are sharp bounds that weaken in obvious ways5
the sharp IV bounds of Manski (1990, 1994).  Section 2.1 gives the general
results and Section 2.2 applies them to monotone treatment selection, which
weakens the familiar assumption of exogenous treatment selection from an IV to
an MIV.
2.1. General Case
The starting point for determination of the identifying power of MIV
assumptions is the no-assumptions bound on E[y(t)*v] of Manski (1989).  Let
[K0, K1] denote the range of Y.  Let u 0 V.  Use the law of iterated expectations
and the fact that E[y(t)*v = u, z = t] = E(y*v = u, z = t) to write
(4)  E[y(t)*v = u]  =  E(y*v = u, z = t)·P(z = t*v = u)
                        + E[y(t)*v = u, z ￿ t]·P(z ￿ t*v = u).
The sampling process identifies each of the quantities on the right side except
for the censored mean E[y(t)*v = u, z ￿ t], which may take any value in the
interval [K0, K1].  This implies the sharp bound
(5)    E(y*v = u, z = t)·P(z = t*v = u) + K0·P(z ￿ t*v = u)
                #  E[y(t)*v = u]  #
        E(y*v = u, z = t)·P(z = t*v = u) + K1·P(z ￿ t*v = u).
An MIV assumption implies the inequality restriction  
(6)  u1  #  u  #  u2   Y   E[y(t)*v = u1]  #  E[y(t)*v = u]  #  E[y(t)*v = u2].6
3 Whereas the MIV assumption (2) implies Proposition 1, the IV assumption (1)
implies that E[y(t)*v = u] is constant across u 0 V.  Hence the common value of
E[y(t)*v = u], u 0 V lies in the intersection of the bounds (5) across all the
elements of V (Manski, 1990).
4 Proposition 1 also applies to semi-monotone instrumental variable assumptions,
in which the set V is only semi-ordered rather than ordered.  The inequality (2)
holds as stated, it being understood that there may exist some pairs of covariate
values that are not ordered. 
5 If V is not finite, the result below continues to hold with the summation
replaced by a Lebesgue integral, subject to measurability considerations.
Hence E[y(t)*v = u] is no smaller than the no-assumption lower bound on
E[y(t)*v = u1] and no larger than the no-assumption upper bound on E[y(t)*v = u2].
This holds for all u1 < u and all u2 $ u.  There are no other restrictions on
E[y(t)*v = u].  Thus we have 3 4  
Proposition 1: Let the MIV Assumption (2) hold.  Then for each u 0 V,
(7)      sup [E(y)*v = u1, z = t)·P(z = t*v = u1) + K0·P(z ￿ t*v = u1)]
        u1 # u
       #  E[y(t)*v = u]  #
         inf [E(y*v = u2, z = t)·P(z = t*v = u2) + K1·P(z ￿ t*v = u2)].
        u2 $ u
In the absence of other information, this bound is sharp.  ￿
The MIV bound on the marginal mean E[y(t)] is easily obtained from
Proposition 1.  Assume for simplicity that the set V is finite.5  Then we may use
the law of iterated expectations to write7
(8)  E[y(t)]  =   3 P(v = u)·E[y(t)*v = u].
                 u 0 V
Equation (7) shows that the MIV lower and upper bounds on E[y(t)*v = u] are
weakly increasing in u.  Hence the sharp joint lower (upper) bound on
{E[y(t)*v = u], u  0 V} is obtained by setting each of the quantities
E[y(t)*v = u], u 0 V at its lower (upper) bound as given in (7).  Inserting these
lower and upper bounds into (8) yields
Proposition 1, Corollary 1: Let the MIV Assumption (2) hold.  Then
(9)   3 P(v = u){ sup [E(y*v = u1, z = t)·P(z = t*v = u1) + K0·P(z ￿ t*v = u1)]}
    u 0 V        u1 # u
                              #  E[y(t)]  #
      3 P(v = u){ inf [E(y*v = u2, z = t)·P(z = t*v = u2) + K1·P(z ￿ t*v = u2)]}.
    u 0 V        u2 $ u
In the absence of other information, this bound is sharp.  ￿
The MIV bounds in Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 necessarily are subsets of
the corresponding no-assumptions bounds and supersets of the corresponding IV
bounds.  The MIV and no-assumptions bounds coincide if the no-assumptions lower
and upper bounds on E[y(t)*v = u] weakly increase with u; in such cases the MIV
assumption has no identifying power.  The MIV and IV bounds coincide if the no-
assumptions lower and upper bounds on E[y(t)*v = u] weakly decrease with u; in
such cases, the MIV and IV assumptions have the same identifying power.8
2.2. Monotone Treatment Selection
Certainly the most commonly applied IV assumption is exogenous treatment
selection (ETS).  Here the instrumental variable v is the realized treatment z.
So the IV assumption (1) becomes
ETS Assumption: For each t 0 T, 
(10)  E[y(t)*z = u']  =  E[y(t)*z = u],    ￿ u 0 T, u' 0 T.
As is well known, this assumption implies that E[y(t)] = E(y*z = t).
Weakening equation (10) to an inequality yields the special MIV assumption
that we call monotone treatment selection (MTS):
MTS Assumption: Let T be an ordered set.  For each t 0 T,
(11)  u2  $  u1   Y   E[y(t)*z = u2]  $  E[y(t)*z = u1].
Applying Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 yield these sharp MTS bounds:
Proposition 1, Corollary 2: Let the MTS Assumption (11) hold.  Then 
(12)  u  <  t   Y   K0  #  E[y(t)*z = u]  #  E(y*z = t)  
      u  =  t   Y   E[y(t)*z = u]  =  E(y*z = t)
      u  >  t   Y   E(y*z = t)  #  E[y(t)*z = u]  #  K1.9
and
(13)  K0·P(z < t) + E(y*z = t)·P(z $ t)  #  E[y(t)]
                        #  K1·P(z > t) + E(y*z = t)·P(z # t).
              
In the absence of other information, these bounds are sharp.  ￿ 
To illustrate the ETS and MTS assumptions, consider again the variation of
wages with schooling.  The ETS assumption asserts that persons who select
different levels of schooling have the same mean wage functions.  The MTS
assumption asserts that persons who select higher levels of schooling have weakly
higher mean wage functions than do those who select lower levels of schooling.
Many economic models of schooling choice and wage determination predict that
persons with higher ability have higher mean wage functions and choose higher
levels of schooling than do persons with lower ability.  The MTS assumption is
consistent with these models but the ETS assumption is not.
3. Identification Combining MIV and MTR Assumptions
We examine here the identifying power of an MIV assumption of the form (2)
combined with a monotone treatment response assumption of the form (3).  Section
3.1 motivates MTR assumptions and explains how they differ from MIV assumptions.
Section 3.2 gives the general findings.  Section 3.3 focuses on the important
special case of monotone treatment selection and response.  Section 3.4 obtains
bounds on average treatment effects.10
6 It can be shown that if assumption (1) is weakened to an MIV assumption of form
(2), the value of $ is no longer identified but is bounded.  The proof is
available from the authors.
3.1. MTR Assumptions
Classical econometric analysis of treatment response (Hood and Koopmans,
1953) combines an IV assumption of form (1) with the linear response assumption
(14)  yj(t)  = ßt + ,j,
where ,j is an unobserved covariate.  The central finding is that assumptions (1)
and (14) together identify the response parameter $, provided that z is not mean
independent of v.6  For many years, empirical researchers have applied linear
response models even though these models are not grounded in economic theory or
other substantive reasoning.  The literature has not provided compelling, or even
suggestive, arguments in support of the hypothesis that response varies linearly
with treatment and that all persons have the same response parameter.
Much of the empirical research that has applied linear response models
could more plausibly apply monotone treatment response assumptions of the form
(3) stating that, ceteris paribus, response varies monotonically with treatment.
Consumer theory suggests that, ceteris paribus, the demand for a product weakly
decreases as a function of the product’s price.  The theory of production
suggests that, ceteris paribus, the output of a product weakly increases as a
function of each input into the production process.  Human capital theory
suggests that, ceteris paribus, the wage that a worker earns weakly increases as
a function of the worker’s years of schooling.  In these and other settings, MTR11
7 As discussed earlier, the MTS assumption is consistent with economic models of
schooling choice and wage determination which predict that persons with higher
ability have higher mean wage functions and choose higher levels of schooling
than do persons with lower ability.  The MTR assumption is consistent with
economic models of the production of human capital through schooling.
assumptions have a reasonably firm foundation.
The MIV assumption (2) and MTR assumption (3) are distinct in form and they
have distinct implications for the conditional means E[y(t)*v = u].  Whereas the
MIV assumption implies the sharp bound given in Proposition 1, the MTR assumption
implies this sharp bound (Manski, 1997, Corollary M1.2):
(15)  E(y*v = u, t $ z)·P(t $ z*v = u) + K0·P(t < z*v = u)  #  E[y(t)*v = u]
                     #  E(y*v = u, t # z)·P(t # z*v = u) + K1·P(t > z*v = u).
It is important to understand how the MTS and MTR assumptions differ from
one another.  Consider the variation of wages with schooling.  It is common to
hear the verbal assertion that “wages increase with schooling.”  The MTS and MTR
assumptions interpret this statement in different ways.  The MTS interpretation
is that persons who select higher levels of schooling have weakly higher mean
wage functions than do those who select lower levels of schooling; that is, u2
$ u1 Y E[y(t)*z = u2] $ E[y(t)*z = u1] for each t 0 T.  The MTR interpretation
is that each person’s wage function is weakly increasing in conjectured years of
schooling; that is, for each j 0 J, t2 $ t1 Y yj(t2) $ yj(t1).  Although the MTS
and MTR interpretations of the statement “wages increase with schooling” are
distinct, they are not mutually exclusive.712
3.2. General Findings
It is straightforward to combine an MTR assumption with an MIV assumption.
We simply repeat the derivation of Section 2.1, with the MTR bound (15) replacing
the no-assumptions bound (5).  Let v be an MIV.  Then we have the inequality (6).
Hence E[y(t)*v = u] is no smaller than the MTR lower bound on E[y(t)*v = u1] and
no larger than the MTR upper bound on E[y(t)*v = u2].  This holds for all u1 < u
and all u2 > u.  There are no other restrictions on E[y(t)*v = u].  Thus
Proposition 2: Let the MIV and MTR Assumptions (2) and (3) hold.  Then
(16)     sup [E(y*v = u1, t $ z)·P(t $ z*v = u1) + K0·P(t < z*v = u1)]
        u1 # u
       #  E[y(t)*v = u]  #
         inf [E(y*v = u2, t # z)·P(t # z*v = u2) + K1·P(t > z*v = u2)]
        u2 $ u
for each u 0 V. In the absence of other information, this bound is sharp.  ￿
The MIV-MTR bound on the marginal mean E[y(t)] is obtained from (16).
Recall the application of the law of iterated expectations given in (8).
Proposition 2 shows that the MIV-MTR lower and upper bounds on E[y(t)*v = u] are
weakly increasing in u.  Hence the sharp joint lower (upper) bound on
{E[y(t)*v = u], u  0 V} is obtained by setting each of the quantities
E[y(t)*v = u], u 0 V at its lower (upper) bound in (16).  Inserting these lower
and upper bounds into (8) yields13
Proposition 2, Corollary 1: Let the MIV-MTR Assumptions (2) and (3) hold.  Then
(17)  3 P(v = u) { sup [E(y*v = u1, t $ z)·P(t $ z*v = u1) + K0·P(t < z*v = u1)]}
    u 0 V         u1 # u
                              #  E[y(t)]  #
     3 P(v = u) { inf [E(y*v = u2, t # z)·P(t # z*v = u2) + K1·P(t > z*v = u2)]}.
   u 0 V         u2 $ u
In the absence of other information, this bound is sharp.  ￿
3.3. Monotone Treatment Selection and Response
In general, the MIV-MTR bounds on E[y(t)*v = u] and E[y(t)] are informative
only if the outcome space Y is bounded.  Yet there is an important special case
in which these bounds are informative even if Y is unbounded.  This is the case
of monotone treatment selection, in which v = z.  Application of Proposition 2
yields this MTS-MTR bound on E[y(t)*z = u]:
(18)  u  <  t   Y    sup E(y*z = u1)  #  E[y(t)*z = u]  #  inf  E(y*z = u2)
                    u1 # u                                u2 $ t
      u  =  t   Y    sup E(y*z = u1)  #  E[y(t)*z = u]  #  inf  E(y*z = u2)
                    u1 # t                                u2 $ t
      u  >  t   Y    sup E(y*z = u1)  #  E[y(t)*z = u]  #  inf  E(y*z = u2).
                    u1 # t                                u2 $ u14
8 Equation (19) suggests a test of the joint MTS-MTR hypothesis.  Under this
hypothesis, E(y*z = u) must be a weakly increasing function of u.  Hence we
should reject the hypothesis if E(y*z = u) is not weakly increasing in u. This
test is a weakened version of the stochastic dominance test proposed in Manski
(1997, p.1327) for testing the joint hypothesis that treatment response is
monotone and that z is statistically independent of y(·).
It follows from the MTS and MTR assumptions that 8
(19)  u’ # u  Y  E(y*z = u’) =  E[y(u’)*z = u’]  #  E[y(u)*z = u’]
                                                 #  E[y(u)*z = u] =  E(y*z = u).
Combining (18) and (19) yields these MTS-MTR bounds, which are informative even
if Y is unbounded:
Proposition 2, Corollary 2: Let the MTS-MTR Assumptions (11) and (3) hold.  Then
(20)  u  <  t   Y   E(y*z = u)  #  E[y(t)*z = u]  #  E(y*z = t)
      u  =  t   Y   E[y(t)*z = u]  =  E(y*z = t)
      u  >  t   Y   E(y*z = t)  #  E[y(t)*z = u]  #  E(y*z = u)
and
(21)   3  E(y*z = u)·P(z = u) + E(y*z = t)·P(z $ t)  #  E[y(t)]
     u < t
                        #    3  E(y*z = u)·P(z = u) + E(y*z = t)·P(z # t). 
                           u > t 
In the absence of other information, these bounds are sharp.  ￿15
3.4. Bounds on Average Treatment Effects
Propositions 1 and 2 give sharp bounds on mean outcomes under specified
treatments.  Let s and t be two such treatments, with s < t.  Often the objects
of interest are average treatment effects of the form
(22)  )(s, t)  /  E[y(t)] - E[y(s)].
If only an MIV assumption is imposed, the sharp lower (upper) bound on
)(s, t) is obtained by subtracting the lower (upper) bound on E[y(t)] from the
upper (lower) bound on E[y(s)].  If MIV and MTR assumptions are imposed, a bound
on )(s, t) may be obtained in the same manner but this bound is not sharp.  The
general case is complex to analyze, but the MTS-MTR case is straightforward.
Let u 0 T.  Under the MTS-MTR assumption, equation (20) gives sharp bounds
on each of E[y(t)*z = u] and E[y(s)*z = u].  Inspection of these bounds shows
that it is jointly feasible for E[y(t)*z = u] to be at its upper bound and
E[y(s)*z = u] to be at its lower bound.  Thus the MTS-MTR sharp upper bound on
)(s, t) is the upper bound on E[y(t)] minus the lower bound on E[y(s)], namely
(23)  )(s, t)  #    3  E(y*z = u)·P(z = u) + E(y*z = t)·P(z # t) 
                  u > t 
                     -  3  E(y*z = u)·P(z = u) - E(y*z = s)·P(z $ s)
                      u < s
=   3 [E(y*z = t) - E(y*z = u)]@P(z = u) + [E(y*z = t) - E(y*z = s)]·P(s # z # t)
  u < s
    +    3 [E(y*z = u) - E(y*z = s)]·P(z = u).
       u > t 16
Observe that, by (19), the right side of (23) is non-negative and no smaller than
E(y*z = t) - E(y*z = s), which is the value of )(s, t) under the ETS assumption.
In contrast, it is not jointly feasible for E[y(t)*z = u] to be at its
lower bound and E[y(s)*z = u] to be at its upper bound.  Placing E[y(t)*z = u]
and E[y(s)*z = u] at these limit points yields a non-positive value for )(s, t).
Under the MTR assumption, however, the lower bound on )(s, t) must be no less
than zero (see Manski, 1997, and Pepper, 1997).  Our application of the MTS-MTR
assumption in the next section uses (23) as the upper bound on )(s, t) and zero
as the lower bound.
4. Empirical Analysis of The Returns to Schooling
4.1. Maintained Assumptions
Labor economists studying schooling as a treatment commonly suppose that
each individual j has a log(wage) function yj(t), giving the log(wage) that j
would receive were he to obtain t years of schooling.  In theories of schooling
and labor supply, y j(@) is interpreted as person j’s production function for human
capital.  Observing realized covariates, schooling, and wages, labor economists
often seek to learn features of the distribution of these production functions
in a sub-population of interest.  In particular, many studies report estimates
of the expected returns to completing t years of schooling relative to s years
for s < t, namely )(s, t*w), where the covariates w define the sub-population of17
9 The literature on the returns to schooling, as other applied literatures on
treatment response, exhibits varying definitions of the sub-population of
interest.  The definition matters substantively whenever there is concern that
treatment response may vary from person to person.  Considerations in defining
the sub-population of interest are discussed in many sources, including Heckman
and Robb (1985), Björkland and Moffitt (1987), and Manski (1996).  The
theoretical analysis in the present paper applies to any sub-population of known
composition; that is, to a sub-population defined by conditioning on observable
covariates w.  Our analysis does not apply to sub-populations of unknown
composition, such as those defined by Imbens and Angrist (1994)and by Heckman and
Vytlacil (1999) in their studies of local average and local IV treatment effects.
10 See, for example, Angrist and Kreuger (1991), Blakemore and Low (1984),
Blackburn and Neumark (1993, 1995), Butcher and Case (1994), Card (1993, 1994),
Frazis (1993), Garen (1984), Kenny et al. (1979), Lang and Ruud (1986), Murphy
and Welch (1989), Osterbeek (1990), and Willis and Rosen (1979).
11 A potential counter to the MTS assumption is suggested by Card (1994), who
speculates that ability and taste for schooling may be negatively associated.
interest.9
To infer the returns to schooling, some researchers assume that treatment
selection is exogenous. Others use family and environmental attributes as
instrumental variables.10 Yet the validity of whatever IV assumption is imposed
seems inevitably to be questioned.  Researchers also often assume, without
compelling reason, that log(wage) varies linearly with conjectured schooling.
The empirical analysis presented here assumes only that treatment selection
and response are monotone. As discussed in Section 3.1, the MTS and MTR
assumptions are consistent with conventional theories of human capital
accumulation.  Even if these assumptions do not warrant unquestioned acceptance,
they certainly merit serious consideration.11
4.2. Data
 We use data from the NLSY.  In its base year of 1979, the NLSY interviewed18
12,686 persons who were between the ages of 14 to 22 at that time.  Nearly half
of the respondents were randomly sampled, the remaining being selected to over-
represent certain demographic groups (see Center for Human Resource Research,
1995).  We restrict attention to the 1,257 randomly sampled white males who, in
1994, reported that they were full-time year-round workers with positive wages.
We exclude the self-employed.  Thus our empirical analysis concerns the sub-
population of persons who, in the notation introduced in Section 1 but since left
implicit, have the shared observable covariates
(24) w  = (white males, full-time year-round workers in 1994, not self-employed).
We observe each respondent’s 1994 hourly wage and realized years of
schooling.  In our notation, z is realized years of schooling, the response
variable yj(t) is the log(wage) that person j would experience if he were to have
t years of schooling, and yj = yj(zj) is the observed hourly log(wage).
4.3. Statistical Considerations
The bounds developed in Propositions 1 and 2 are continuous functions of
various nonparametrically estimable conditional probabilities and mean responses.
In our application, we need only estimate the MTS-MTR upper bound on )(s, t)
given in (23).  Thus we need only estimate the probabilities P(z) of realizing
z years of schooling and the expectations E(y*z) of log(wage) conditional on
schooling.  For each value of z, we use the empirical distribution of schooling
to estimate P(z) and the sample average log(wage) of respondents with z years of
schooling to estimate E(y*z).  So estimation of the MTS-MTR upper bound is a19
12 We caution readers that some applications may not be as straightforward from
a statistical perspective.  In general, applications of Proposition 1 and 2
requiring taking infs and sups of collections of nonparametric regression
estimates.  The consistency of the resulting bounds estimates is easy to
establish, but the sampling distributions of these estimates is not yet well
understood.  A particular concern is that lower (upper) bound estimates, being
sups (infs) of collections of nonparametric regression estimates, may have non-
negligible positive (negative) finite-sample biases.  This concern does not arise
in the special case of MTS-MTR bounds, which do not require taking sups and infs.
We do not attempt to resolve the open statistical questions associated with
general applications of MIV bounds in this paper, which is primarily concerned
with identification.
simple matter.
Asymptotically-valid sampling confidence intervals for the bounds may be
computed using the delta method or bootstrap approaches.  We apply the percentile
bootstrap method.  To be precise, the bootstrap sampling distribution of an
estimate of the MTS-MTR upper bound (23) is its sampling distribution under the
assumption that the unknown population distribution of (AFQT score, realized
years of schooling, realized wages) among persons with the covariates w specified
in (24) equals the empirical distribution of these variables in the sample of
1,257 randomly sampled NLSY respondents.  Next to each upper bound estimate we
report the 0.95 quantile of its bootstrap sampling distribution.12
4.4. Findings
Table 1 gives the estimates of E(y*z) and P(z) that we use to estimate the
MTS-MTR bounds.  The table shows that 41 percent of the NLSY respondents have 12
years of schooling and 19 percent have 16 years, but the support of the schooling
distribution stretches from 8 years to 20 years.  Hence we are able to report
findings on )(s, t) for t = 9 through 20 and 8 # s < t.       
In Section 3.3 we observed that the MTS-MTR assumption is a testable20
13 Point estimates of these treatment effects under the assumption of exogenous
treatment selection may be obtained directly from the first column of Table 1.
Under the ETS assumption, )(s, t) =  E(y*z = t) - E(y*z = s).
hypothesis, which should be rejected if E(y*z = u) is not weakly increasing in
u.  The estimate of E(y*z) in Table 1 for the most part does increase with z, but
there are occasional dips.  Computing a uniform 95 percent confidence band for
the estimate of E(y*z), we have found that the band contains everywhere monotone
functions.  Hence we proceed on the basis that the MTS-MTR assumption is
consistent with the empirical evidence.
Table 1: NLSY Empirical Mean log(wages) and Distribution of Years of Schooling
 z E(y|z)  P(z)    Sample Size
 8 2.249  0.014   18
 9 2.302  0.018   22
10 2.195  0.018     23
11 2.346  0.025   32
12 2.496  0.413  519
13 2.658  0.074   93
14 2.639   0.083  104
15 2.693  0.035   44
16 2.870  0.189  238
17 2.775  0.038   48
18 3.006  0.051   64
19 3.009  0.020   25
20    2.936             0.021               27    
Total 1 1257
Table 2 reports the estimates and 0.95 bootstrap quantiles of the MTS-MTR
upper bounds on  )(t - 1, t), t = 9,...,20 followed by the upper bound on
)(12, 16), which compares high school completion with college completion.13  To
provide context for these upper bound estimates, let us review some of the point
estimates of )(t - 1, t)reported in the recent empirical literature on the
returns to schooling.  Most of the point estimates cited in the survey by Card21
(1994) are between 0.07 and 0.09.  Card (1993), using a linear response model and
assuming that proximity to college is an IV, reports a point estimate of 0.132.
Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994), assuming that treatment selection is exogenous
within their sample of twins, report various estimates and conclude that (p.
1171): “our best estimate is that increased schooling increases averages wage
rates by about 12-16 percent per year completed.”
Table 2: MTS-MTR Upper Bounds on Returns to Schooling 
  Upper Bound on )(s, t)   
 s  t        Estimate 0.95 Bootstrap Quantile
 8  9 0.390   0.531
 9  10 0.334 0.408
10  11 0.445 0.525
11 12 0.313 0.416
12 13 0.253 0.307
13 14 0.159 0.226
14 15 0.202 0.288
15 16 0.304 0.369
16 17 0.165 0.256
17 18 0.386 0.485
18 19 0.368 0.539
19 20     0.296             0.486
--    --          -----             -----
12 16          0.397 0.450
None of the estimates of upper bounds on )(t - 1, t) in Table 2 lie below
the point estimates reported in the literature.  The smallest of the upper bound
estimates are 0.159 for )(13, 14) and 0.165 for )(16, 17).  These are about equal
to the largest of the point estimates known to us, namely those in Ashenfelter
and Krueger (1994).  It might therefore appear that the MTS-MTR assumption does
not, in this application, have sufficient identifying power to affect current
thinking about the magnitude of the returns to schooling.
A different conclusion emerges with consideration of the estimate of the22
upper bound on )(12, 16).  We estimate that completion of a four-year college
yields at most an increase of 0.397 in mean log(wage) relative to completion of
high school.  This implies that the average value of the four year-by-year
treatment effects )(12, 13), )(13, 14), )(14, 15), and )(15, 16) is at most
0.099, which is well below the point estimates of Card (1993) and Ashenfelter and
Krueger (1994).  This conclusion continues in force if, acting conservatively,
one uses the 0.95 bootstrap quantile of 0.450 to estimate the upper bound on
)(12, 16).  Then the implied upper bound on the average value of the year-by-year
treatment effects is 0.113.  Thus we find that, under the MTS-MTR assumption, the
returns to college-level schooling are smaller than some of the point estimates
reported recently.
5. Some Variations on the Theme
This paper has introduced the general idea of a monotone instrumental
variable and the important special case of monotone treatment selection. It is
easy to think of variations on the MIV theme that warrant study.  One would be
to combine the MIV idea with the idea of contaminated instruments introduced by
Hotz, Mullins, and Sanders (1997).  Another would be to begin from the
statistical independence assumption that holds in classical randomized
experiments and weaken it to a stochastic dominance assumption.  Yet another
variation on the MIV theme would be to weaken mean independence to some form of
approximate mean independence.23
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